437, Annual Review of Resource Economics Even though the mentioned motivations for building flexibility mechanisms into the global climate change regime appear intuitive and are also strongly advocated in the environmental economics literature, empirical research has found it surprisingly hard to identify the assumed economic logic in real-world climate policy. Vol. 15: 469, Annual Review of Environment and Resources Because, unlike in the ozone case, it will probably be impossible to mobilize sufficient transfer payments to simply buy off emerging economies, research at the micro and meso levels in these countries is particularly important. They have addressed the climate-conflict claim mainly along three lines. Read-only nodes can be added to a cluster at any time. 70, Annual Review of Environment and Resources - Vol. 383, Annual Review of Political Science Vol. - Vol. - Vol. Vol. 189 If firms and households believe, however, that the government could abandon these costly measures once the next economic downturn or change of government arrives, they are less likely to invest in climate change mitigation in the first place. It would exist even if one single world government could decide autocratically whether or not to reduce GHG emissions worldwide. 183 27 533, Annual Review of Economics 2011, Wapner 2011) and call for reforms and greater centralization of governance structures (Gehring & Oberthur 2009; Biermann et al. 35 113, Annual Review of Resource Economics 360, Annual Review of Resource Economics - Vol. Emission allowances or credits can be traded among firms and countries. 44: A cross-country analysis, A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems, Institutional diffusion in international environmental affairs, Self-interest and environmental management, Distributing the burdens of climate change, Climate change, social theory and justice, Legitimation and accumulation in climate change governance, Do recipient country characteristics affect international spillovers of CO, Political marginalization, climate change, and conflict in African Sahel states, The search for safety: the effects of conflict, poverty and ecological influences on migration in the developing world, States, NGOs, and international environmental institutions, Burden sharing and fairness principles in international climate policy, Climate agreements based on responsibility for global warming: periodic updating, policy choices, and regional costs, Ecologically unequal exchange, ecological debt, and climate justice.

The political uncertainty problem described here is somewhat similar to the time-inconsistency problem in economic theory. Moreover, countries who fall behind on their obligations are not allowed to sell emission permits in the next period.

The reason is that forms of pollution that exert direct and short-term local damages receive political priority over forms of pollution that can be “exported” into the global atmosphere and have indirect, long-term implications. -

In essence, it occurs (a) when a higher level of income has generated both stronger preferences for postmaterial goods and greater financial, technological, and institutional (state) capacity to address environmental problems, and (b) when the services sector expands at the expense of traditional pollution-intensive industries. - 12: 209, Annual Review of Environment and Resources Le site web des sorties culturelles dans le Nord. 6:

106, Annual Review of Environment and Resources 10: Vol. 39:

First, they have examined whether there is a direct relationship between climatic changes (or climate variability) and large-scale political violence measured in terms of civil or interstate war (Zhang et al. The economic rationale is that this reduces mitigation costs because countries with high marginal abatement costs can finance reductions in countries with low marginal abatement costs. 7: 229 283, Annual Review of Political Science The key problem here concerns discounting. Vol. LillelaNuit.com, Lille, France. 7: 2012), migration, and adaptation strategies, as well as other facets of human security.

28: 2012 for a specific proposal). 433 - 581 The presumption here is that traditional state consent to international treaties has become insufficient as a legitimating device in the case of complex global policy problems that are negotiated and regulated far away from the domestic demos (Bodansky 1999, 2010).